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FROM HEALTH POLICY TO STIGMA AND BACK AGAIN:
THE FEEDBACK LOOP PERPETUATING THE OPIOIDS CRISIS
Nicolas Terry*
I. INTRODUCTION
Between 1999 and 2017, almost 400,000 people died from opioid overdoses,1
and since 2001, the opioid crisis has cost the U.S. more than 1 trillion dollars.2 In
late 2018, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary opined
that the country was “beginning to turn the tide” in responding to the crisis.3
Secretary Azar’s positive statements were based on preliminary CDC data that
showed a national decline of 2.7 percent in drug overdose deaths from October 2017
to May 2018.4 However, data still show over half the states posting an increase in
overdose deaths5 with a concentration of higher death rates in the upper Midwest
and Appalachia.6 Recent sobering data from CDC, also showed a national decline in
life expectancy for the third year in a row.7 A 2018 McKinsey report argued that the
*
© 2019 Nicolas Terry. I am grateful to the Indiana University Additions Grand
Challenge for supporting this research. Responding to the Addictions Crisis, INDIANA
UNIVERSITY, https://grandchallenges.iu.edu/addiction/index.html [https://perma.cc/4JVATC76]. Hall Render Professor of Law, Executive Director, Hall Center for Law and Health,
Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law. Email: npterry@iupui.edu. I express
my thanks to Aila Hoss for her thoughtful comments on an earlier draft and to Emily
Beukema for her research and editorial assistance.
1
Understanding the Epidemic, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic/index.html [https://perma.cc/GB3Y-ZLF3].
2
Economic Toll of Opioid Crisis in U.S. Exceeded $1 Trillion Since 2001, ALATRUM
(Feb. 13, 2018), https://altarum.org/news/economic-toll-opioid-crisis-us-exceeded-1trillion-2001 [https://perma.cc/XL4G-D85T].
3
E.g., German Lopez, Trump’s Health Secretary Says the Opioid Epidemic May Be
Turning Around. Not so Fast., VOX (Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.vox.com/science-andhealth/2018/10/24/18015532/opioid-epidemic-overdose-deaths-2018-alex-azar-trump
[https://perma.cc/VQG4-YZVT].
4
Id. As of April 2019, the CDC predicts a decline of 3.2% between September 2017
and September 2018, see Vital Statistics Rapid Release: Provisional Drug Overdose Death
Counts, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/vsrr/
drug-overdose-data.htm [https://perma.cc/9W6L-QP42] [hereinafter Vital Statistics].
5
See Vital Statistics, supra note 4.
6
HOLLY HEDEGAARD ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, NCHS DATA BRIEF NO. 329, DRUG OVERDOSE DEATHS
IN THE UNITED STATES, 1999–2017, at 3 (2018), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/
db329-h.pdf [https://perma.cc/M4T9-54UK].
7
SHERRY L. MURPHY ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, NCHS DATA BRIEF NO. 328, MORTALITY IN THE UNITED
STATES, 2017,
6
(2018), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db328-h.pdf
[https://perma.cc/798B-84SN].
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number of persons suffering from opioid use disorder (“OUD”) is likely to be an
underestimate with the actual number being between four and six million persons.8
Even if the most optimistic projections about opioid overdose deaths proved correct,
we will still face new dangers in fentanyl cocktails, as it is mixed with other street
or diverted drugs such as Methamphetamine, cocaine, or benzodiazepines.9 Neither
is there any evidence that we are now better prepared for the next addiction crisis.
Why is it that the United States seems to have little resilience in the face of such
crises? Why aren’t those at risk being diagnosed earlier through preventative care?
Why are so many of those suffering with OUD denied any care or are unable to find
adequate treatment, coordinated care, or recovery services? An earlier article
concentrated on flaws in the healthcare system, arguing that healthcare itself was a
structural determinant of the continuing crisis.10 Specifically, that article was critical
of access and benefit stratification, the failure of some states to adopt Medicaid
expansion (or having done so to make enrollment dependent on burdensome
administrative or work requirements), persistent problems associated with
fragmentation of care, sub-optimal care coordination, and the lack of wraparound
services.11
This Article seeks to provide additional context for those structural
determinants. Furthermore, this analysis extends to identifying causes that are
upstream (for example, social determinants) or downstream (for example,
exceptionalism) from those identified healthcare structural determinants. These
causes and effects include the limitations of our federal structure, social and
structural determinants, and the implications of stigma-reinforcing policymaking.
Together they conspire to create a feedback loop fueled by inadequate goals,
strategies, and tactics.

8

Sarun Charumilind et al., Why We Need Bolder Action to Combat the Opioid
Epidemic, MCKINSEY & COMPANY (Sept. 2018), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/
healthcare-systems-and-services/our-insights/why-we-need-bolder-action-to-combat-theopioid-epidemic [https://perma.cc/PQ5Q-92TU].
9
See HOLLY HEDEGAARD ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, DRUGS MOST FREQUENTLY INVOLVED IN DRUG
OVERDOSE DEATHS: UNITED STATES, 2011–2016 1 (2018); Rachel L. Rothberg & Katie T.
Smith, Fentanyl: A Whole New World?, 46 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 314 (2018) (discussing the
growing black market for fentanyl and the danger it presents because of its potency); see also
Lauren B. Gerlach et al., Factors Associated with Long-term Benzodiazepine Use Among
Older Adults, 178 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1560, 1560 (2018) (noting that one in three older
adults prescribed a benzodiazepine by a nonpsychiatric clinician progressed to risky longterm use).
10
Nicolas Terry, Structural Determinism Amplifying the Opioid Crisis: It’s the
Healthcare, Stupid, 11 NE. U. L. REV. 315 (2019).
11
Id.
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Implicit in this Article is the belief that the U.S. response to the opioid overdose
epidemic is and likely will continue to be fatally flawed. The explicit claim is that
there are multiple causes for this failure and they, each in turn, have negative effects
further downstream. Thus, the absence of a national health policy is both caused by
and plays out in the impact of federalism on healthcare. Healthcare federalism is
partly responsible for failing to adequately address social and structural
determinants, while social determinants, such as unemployment or poverty, feed into
healthcare structural determinants, such as limited access to care. Those structural
barriers in turn tend to be approached with incremental reforms or exceptional
“solutions” (themselves relatable to the absence of a holistic national health policy).
Furthermore, the health discrimination inherent in exceptional rather than parity
models feeds competing narratives (such as moral defect) about the causes of
addictions. Competing narratives give rise to uneven, incomplete, or just plain bad
policies; a rise in policies that perpetuate stigma, delay harm reduction strategies,
and promote supply-side criminalization. Completing the feedback loop, stigma
works against innovative, inclusive national (or even state) policies. The Article
concludes with a brief analysis of the SUPPORT Act of 2018 and explains why this,
the latest well-intentioned federal “solution” to the opioid crisis, hones true to the
systemic issues outlined herein.

788

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 4

II. DEFICIENT NATIONAL HEALTH POLICY
Many, if not most, of the recent national,12 regional,13 and state14 reports on the
opioid crisis have endorsed healthcare and public health initiatives, such as broader
availability of all three types of FDA-approved medication assisted treatment
(“MAT”) in multiple treatment settings (including in prisons and jails), the provision
of wrap-around services, and efforts to tackle the social determinants of health.
Remarkably, there even seems to be broad bipartisan support for these ideas as
evidenced by the passage of a series of federal funding statutes between 2016 and
2018.15 Yet, even with expanded financing from the federal government, progress
has been slow. In part, this has been due to flaws in short-term financing models
such as grants. However, the major problem has been in implementation.
Implementation is impeded because the U.S. lacks a coherent national health
policy. Without some overarching concept and architecture for providing care, a
healthcare “system” is likely to be fragmented and ill-equipped to deal with novel
stressors, such as syndemics or natural disasters. As recognized by the World Health
Organization, national health policies include a defined vision and policy directions
together with strategies for implementation.16 A national health policy could also
influence other areas of government planning, by pursuing the “Health in All

12

See e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FACING ADDICTION IN AMERICA:
THE SURGEON GENERAL’S REPORT ON ALCOHOL, DRUGS, AND HEALTH 4-1, 4-10–11 (2016),
https://addiction.surgeongeneral.gov/sites/default/files/surgeon-generals-report.pdf [https://
perma.cc/RPC3-Y3KV]; see also OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, THE
PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON COMBATING DRUG ADDICTION AND THE OPIOID CRISIS FINAL
REPORT (2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/images/Final_Repo
rt_Draft_11-15-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/73V2-34FG] (demonstrating a national effort to
combat drug addiction); Governors’ Recommendations for Federal Action to End the
Nation’s Opioid
Crisis,
NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N
(Jan.
18,
2018),
https://classic.nga.org/cms/governors-recommendations-opioid-crisis [https://perma.cc/A2
MB-QCQJ] (demonstrating another national effort to combat drug addiction).
13
See e.g., APPALACHIAN REG’L COMM’N, COMMUNICATING ABOUT OPIOIDS IN
APPALACHIA: CHALLENGES, OPPORTUNITIES, AND BEST PRACTICES (2018), http://operation
unite.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Opioid-communication-in-appalachia-ORAU-report
-1-17-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/7HV4-K3J6].
14
See e.g., IND. GOVERNOR’S OFFICE , INDIANA DRUG PREVENTION, TREATMENT AND
ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY ACTION STEPS (May 18, 2017), http://www.in.gov/gov/files/
DPTE%20Preliminary%20Action%20Steps.pdf [https://perma.cc/B34R-KZ6Y]; see also
IND. PRESCRIPTION DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION TASK FORCE, TAKING ACTION: THE FOUR
YEAR REPORT 2012–2016, at 6–10 (2016), https://www.in.gov/bitterpill/files/FINAL%20
Four%20Years%20In%20Action%20Report%20-%20OAG%20Coverchange%20final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5D2K-LYYZ].
15
See infra note 142.
16
National Health Policies, Strategies, and Plans, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Apr. 3,
2019), https://www.who.int/nationalpolicies/nationalpolicies/en/ [https://perma.cc/A5JGM78Z].
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Polices” (“HiAP”) approach to policymaking in order to correct the socioeconomic
inequalities responsible for some of the social determinants of health.17
Obviously, the U.S. has some centralized healthcare regulation and
management. For example, the FDA18 and HHS-OCR19 regulate drugs and devices
and health privacy, respectively. More pertinently, Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services (“CMS”) administers Medicare that covers more than seventeen
percent of the population, has its own policies, and often acts as a bellwether for
private payers.20 CMS also has been active in pulling policy levers to combat the
opioid epidemic, promoting prevention, treatment, and data collection.21 However,
there are at least four reasons why centralized regulation of healthcare, even when
accompanied by financing, is not the same as a national health policy. First, a true
national health policy runs wider and deeper than these federal models. According
to Carl Ameringer, “[t]he failure of the U.S. government to construct a national
health policy that reconciles diverse priorities means that there are no overriding
principles to guide health care delivery.”22 Second, Congress, the branch of
government best positioned to develop health policy, is locked in divisive
partisanship, which is generally and bitterly divided on healthcare reform.23 Third,
most healthcare in the U.S. is provided by private entities or persons.24 The resulting
fragmented system is paid for by a fragmented financing model; the federal and state
governments pay the largest share (41%), followed by private health insurance
(34%) and individuals’ out-of-pocket expenses (11%).25 Fourth, Ameringer’s
17

See generally Health in All Policies, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION
(June 9, 2016), https://www.cdc.gov/policy/hiap/index.html [https://perma.cc/DE9Z-LQB7]
(discussing “a collaborative approach that integrates and articulates health considerations
into policymaking across sectors to improve the health of all communities . . . .”).
18
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399i (1946).
19
45 C.F.R. § 164.500–164.534 (2001).
20
Medicare Beneficiaries as a Percent of Total Population, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY
FOUND., https://www.kff.org/medicare/state-indicator/medicare-beneficiaries-as-of-totalpop/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22
:%22asc%22%7D [https://perma.cc/NU26-4MTP].
21
See e.g., CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., CMS ROADMAP: FIGHTING THE
OPIOD CRISIS (2019), https://www.cms.gov/About-CMS/Agency-Information/Emergency/
Downloads/Opioid-epidemic-roadmap.pdf [https://perma.cc/4CYJ-9ULV].
22
CARL AMERINGER, U.S. HEALTH POLICY AND HEALTH CARE DELIVERY: DOCTORS,
REFORMERS, AND ENTREPRENEURS 13 (2018).
23
Alison Kodjak, Democrats’ Health Care Ambitions Meet the Reality of Divided
Government, NPR (Jan. 9, 2019, 11:40 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2019/01/09/683055963/democrats-health-care-ambitions-meet-the-reality-of-dividedgovernment [https://perma.cc/8X22-4ZQZ].
24
Josh Cothran, Infographic — US Health Care Spending: Who Pays?, CAL. HEALTH
CARE FOUND. (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.chcf.org/publication/us-health-care-spendingwho-pays/ [https://perma.cc/AX79-BTMX].
25
CAL. HEALTHCARE FOUND., HEALTH CARE COSTS 101: A CONTINUING ECONOMIC
THREAT 22 (2018), https://www.chcf.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/HealthCareCosts
2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/NS2P-SFNE].
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observations have particular salience in the opioid context: “neither the provision of
care nor the financing of it targets the entire population” and that “finance and
delivery are mostly separate and distinct.”26 It is likely that these issues are further
exacerbated by the lack of HiAP coordination between U.S. healthcare and other
federal or state social services.
Only an approximation of a national healthcare policy can be inferred from the
Affordable Care Act (“ACA”):27 that the federal government will encourage, even
subsidize access to health insurance.28 However, a true national healthcare policy
requires more broadly stated goals, such as universal access to care or the adoption
of the principle of solidarity.29 In contrast, a Rand analysis of post-ACA healthcare
policy instead identified a paralyzed policy environment revealing:
tensions between many health policy goals—for example, expanding
coverage versus reducing costs; targeting tax credits effectively versus
incentivizing work; protecting the sickest and most expensive patients
versus preserving choice among the majority of patients who may not need
comprehensive coverage; and limiting the federal government’s cost
liability versus minimizing cost-shifting to consumers and states.30
A national healthcare policy also should be the place for broad-ranging,
evidence-based cost-effectiveness analysis. For example, the Surgeon General’s
2016 report concluded that “evaluations of Medicaid expenditures for substance use
disorder treatment show that the costs of treating substance use disorders are more
than offset by the accompanying savings to Medicaid in reduced health care costs,
such as reductions in future substance use disorder-related hospitalizations and
residential treatment costs.”31 For example, a 2008 report from Substance Abuse and
Mental Health Services Administration (“SAMHSA”) estimated that every dollar
spent on effective school-based programs would save an estimated $18 in education
and healthcare costs.32 The National Insititute on Drug Abuse (“NIDA”) estimates
that “every dollar invested in addiction treatment programs yields a return of
between $4 and $7 in reduced drug-related crime, criminal justice costs, and theft.
26

AMERINGER, supra note 22, at 13.
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148 (2010).
28
See, e.g., Subsidized Coverage, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/
glossary/subsidized-coverage/ [https://perma.cc/XY95-X6MN].
29
See generally Richard B. Saltman, Health Sector Solidarity: A Core European Value
But with Broadly Varying Content, 4 ISR. J. HEALTH POL’Y RES. 1 (2015).
30
The Future of U.S. Health Care: Replace or Revise the Affordable Care Act?, RAND
HEALTH CARE, https://www.rand.org/health-care/key-topics/health-policy/in-depth.html
[https://perma.cc/9GW8-DZRJ].
31
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 12, at 6–18 .
32
TED R. MILLER & DELIA HENDRIE, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS.
ADMIN., SUBSTANCE ABUSE PREVENTION DOLLARS AND CENTS: A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
2
(2008),
https://www.samhsa.gov/sites/default/files/cost-benefits-prevention.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6VVM-5ZBT].
27
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When savings related to healthcare are included, total savings can exceed costs by a
ratio of 12 to 1.”33 A HiAP approach could also be implemented through reallocation
of resources; for example, Ohio’s “Issue 1” drug decriminalization constitutional
amendment that failed in 2018 would have required the state to invest sums saved
from the reduction of inmates on drug treatment, crime victim, and rehabilitation
programs.34 Finally, national policies can result in broader strategic initiatives. For
example, the opioid crisis requires healthcare and public health initiatives that
extend beyond harm reduction and include broader availability of all three types of
FDA-approved MAT in multiple treatment settings (including in prisons and jails),35
the provision of wrap-around services, and efforts to tackle the social determinants
of health.
III. FEDERALISM
National healthcare policies tend to be associated with unitary governments.36
To an extent, therefore, federalism is intertwined with our national healthcare policy
vacuum. Furthermore, federalism reinforces the fragmentation of our healthcare
system. Even after the ACA (that was viewed by some conservatives as a
“usurpation” of long-standing state authority in regulating private insurance37), the
levers of central government are quite limited, with states still responsible for
exercising their police powers to protect the welfare, safety, and health of the public.
The economies of the U.S. states have recovered from the great recession.38
However, Medicaid now absorbs more than seventeen percent of state revenue39 and

33
NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, PRINCIPLES OF DRUG ADDICTION TREATMENT: A
RESEARCH-BASED GUIDE 14 (3rd ed. 2018), https://www.drugabuse.gov/node/pdf/675/
principles-of-drug-addiction-treatment-a-research-based-guide-third-edition [https://perma.
cc/DQ4G-DXVV].
34
Ohio Issue 1, Drug and Criminal Justice Policies Initiative (2018), BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Ohio_Issue_1,_Drug_and_Criminal_Justice_Policies_Initiative_(20
18) [https://perma.cc/M8RP-89FT].
35
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 12, at 6–18.
36
WORLD HEALTH ORG., ORGANIZATION AND FINANCING OF PUBLIC HEALTH
SERVICES IN EUROPE: COUNTRY REPORTS 5, 23, 35, 49, 95 (Bernd Rechel et al. eds., 2018),
http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0011/370946/public-health-services.pdf
[https://perma.cc/74GU-BQAT].
37
EDMUND F. HAISLMAIER & BRIAN C. BLASE, THE HERITAGE FOUND., OBAMACARE:
IMPACT ON STATES 1 (2010), http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2010/pdf/bg2433.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9UXA-UAHP].
38
See generally Fiscal 50: State Trends and Analysis, PEW (Mar. 11, 2019),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2014/05/19/fiscal-50-statetrends-and-analysis [https://perma.cc/8DY2-S9PW].
39
Fiscal 50: State Trends and Analysis: More Than 17 Percent of State Revenue Goes
to Medicaid, PEW (June 20, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/data-visualizations/2014/fiscal-50#ind7 [https://perma.cc/3X54-3MUY].
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states hit hardest by the opioid epidemic are experiencing slower growth.40 The
states alone cannot fund the kind of healthcare initiatives necessitated by the opioid
epidemic. Therefore, the states must look to the federal government. This implicates
a legion of problems. First, until quite recently there has not been very much
Congressional enthusiasm for paying for the opioid epidemic.41 Second, when it
comes to the financing of healthcare (particularly Medicaid), Congressional
conservatives want to see a reduction in the uncapped flow of money to the states,
preferring block grants that provide limited sums for defined purposes.42 The other
way that the federal government caps the flow of funds to the states in emergencies
is by establishing federally supervised grant programs. During the opioid epidemic,
this has translated into grant programs administered by SAMHSA.43 Typically,
however generous, grants are time-limited without any guarantee of renewal. Such
short spending horizons can handcuff state governments who will be hesitant to
build out infrastructure and capacity without having ongoing funding to service it.
Third, assuming the federal appropriations process is successfully navigated,44 there
will be delays in the distribution of funds as federal and state regulators work to draft
funding mechanisms and oversight regulations in advance of releasing resources to
bear on the crisis.
Sometimes the downsides of federalism are spun as an opportunity, “that a
single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”45
However, in healthcare and particularly in responses to the opioid epidemic, the
mythology surrounding state or private entity laboratories of innovation seems
40

Barb Rosewicz & Joe Fleming, Look West for Strongest Growth Since the Recession,
PEW (Nov. 19, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2018/11
/19/look-west-for-strongest-growth-since-the-recession [https://perma.cc/7RSJ-L2XX].
41
See Associated Press, U.S. Government Will Spend $4.6 Billion Fighting Opioid
Crisis. Advocates Say That’s Not Nearly Enough, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2018, 4:55 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-opiod-crisis-20180325-story.html [https://
perma.cc/W3FA-CP75] (providing a quote from a former U.S. representative stating that
“Congress needs to devote more money”).
42
Peter Sullivan, Trump Officials Consider Allowing Medicaid Block Grants for States,
HILL (Jan. 11, 2019, 4:17 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/424988-trumpofficials-consider-allowing-medicaid-block-grants-for-states
[https://perma.cc/H4PTAVN7]; see generally Laura Snyder & Robin Rudowitz, Medicaid Financing: How Does It
Work and What Are the Implications?, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (May 20, 2015),
https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/medicaid-financing-how-does-it-work-and-whatare-the-implications/ [https://perma.cc/7HKQ-K4BF].
43
See, e.g., State Opioid Response Grants, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH
SERVS. ADMIN. (Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.samhsa.gov/grants/grant-announcements/ti-18015 [https://perma.cc/847Y-88MF].
44
See generally JAMES V. SATURNO ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42388, THE
CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTION (Nov. 30, 2016),
https://www.senate.gov/CRSpubs/8013e37d-4a09-46f0-b1e2-c14915d498a6.pdf [https://
perma.cc/WJ5P-VNH3].
45
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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defensible.46 As Kristin Madison notes, “[f]lexibility permits but does not guarantee
innovation.”47 Indeed, the federal tools intended to promote state innovation such as
Section 111548 and Section 1332 waivers49 increasingly are being used to undermine
not improve federal health policies.50 Furthermore, many apparent state innovations
such as Washington’s plans for a “public option,”51 Minnesota’s reinsurance
program,52 or Maryland’s proposed individual mandate53 are less about
experimentation and more about building state moats to protect against federal
neglect, sabotage, or piece-by-piece repeal of the ACA.54
Pockets of innovation in opioid policy or innovation are detectible and should
be lauded. They include the MAT programs at Rikers Island55 and in Rhode Island,56
46
Cf. Hannah J. Wiseman & Dave Owen, Federal Laboratories of Democracy, 52 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1119 (2018) (arguing that state “laboratories” are rare and that the federal
government is a key driver of experimentaion).
47
Kristin Madison, Building A Better Laboratory: The Federal Role in Promoting
Health System Experimentation, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 765, 776 (2014).
48
Elizabeth Hinton et al., Section 1115 Medicaid Demonstrative Waivers: The Current
Landscape of Approved and Pending Waivers, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Feb. 12,
2019),
https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/section-1115-medicaid-demonstrationwaivers-the-current-landscape-of-approved-and-pending-waivers/ [https://perma.cc/G8PTHTW9].
49
Tracking Section 1332 State Innovation Waivers, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND.
(Aug. 23, 2018), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/fact-sheet/tracking-section-1332-stateinnovation-waivers/ [https://perma.cc/V9DQ-UE74].
50
See, e.g., Timothy S. Jost, Using the 1332 State Waiver Program to Undermine the
Affordable Care Act State by State, COMMONWEALTH FUND: TO THE POINT (Oct. 30, 2018),
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/blog/2018/using-1332-state-waiver-program-under
mine-affordable-care-act-state-state [https://perma.cc/74D7-4KCX].
51
Ryan Blethen & Joseph O’Sullivan, Inslee Proposes ‘Public Option’ HealthInsurance
Plan
for
Washington,
SEATTLE
T IMES
(Jan.
8,
2019),
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/inslee-proposes-public-option-healthinsurance-plan-for-washington/ [https://perma.cc/DT2A-NMXH].
52
Christopher Snowbeck, Minnesota Health Insurers Propose Lower Premiums, STAR
TRIB. (June 15, 2018), http://www.startribune.com/minnesota-health-insurers-proposelower-premiums/485674372/ [https://perma.cc/39Q5-D3WK].
53
Andrea K. McDaniels, General Assembly Weighs Bill to Require Marylanders to Buy
Health Insurance, BALT. SUN (Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.baltimoresun.com/health/bs-hsindividual-mandate-20180216-story.html [https://perma.cc/6UQV-M39V].
54
See generally Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 5, City of Columbus
v. Trump, No. 18-cv-2364 (D. Md. Aug. 2, 2018), https://democracyforward.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/08/ACA-Complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/6FRT-LFYX] (alleging
sabotage of ACA by the Trump Administration).
55
Christine Vestal, At Rikers Island, a Legacy of Medication-Assisted Opioid
Treatment, PEW: STATELINE (May 23, 2016), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/blogs/stateline/2016/05/23/at-rikers-island-a-legacy-of-medication-assisted-opioid
-treatment [https://perma.cc/8YPA-JQC2].
56
Andrea Hsu & Ari Shapiro, Rhode Island Prisons Push to Get Inmates the Best
Treatment for Opioid Addiction, NPR (Nov. 19, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-
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the Police Assisted Addiction Recovery Initiative (PAARI) program in Gloucester,
Massachusetts,57 and Vermont’s Hub-and-Spoke treatment model.58 Overall,
however, innovations in the opioid space such as safe injection sites are as likely to
be faced with objections based on stigma and moral defect.59 Equally, state programs
may find themselves battling their own “federalism” problem as decentralization
within the states delegates’ questions, such as whether to implement a syringe
exchange to smaller political entities like county departments of health.60
IV. SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH
Nowhere are the absence of a national healthcare policy and federalism felt
more than in the public healthcare system. According to the Institute of Medicine,
The fragmentation of the governmental public health infrastructure is in
part a direct result of the way in which governmental roles and
responsibilities at the federal, state, and local levels have evolved over
U.S. history. This history also explains why the nation lacks a
comprehensive national health policy that could be used to align healthsector investment, governmental public health agency structure and
function, and incentives for the private sector to work more effectively as
part of a broader public health system.61
Without a properly funded and organized public healthcare system, the U.S. will
continue struggling to address the social determinants of health. Social determinants
are nonmedical factors, such as “the conditions in which people are born, grow, live,
work and age . . . [and] are mostly responsible for health inequities.”62 They include
education, housing, employment (there are relatively few recovery-friendly
workplaces63), and the availability of transport. Social determinants have been
shots/2018/11/19/668340844/rhode-island-prisons-push-to-get-inmates-the-best-treatmentfor-opioid-addiction [https://perma.cc/2LU4-F4Q3].
57
See Davida M. Schiff et al., A Police-Led Addiction Treatment Referral Program in
Gloucester, MA: Implementation and Participants’ Experiences, 82 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE
TREATMENT 41, 42 (2017).
58
See infra text accompanying note 120.
59
Jessica Cohen, Supervised Injection Facilities Face Obstacles, But That Shouldn’t
Stop Them, HEALTH AFF.: BLOG (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/
hblog20181127.121405/full/ [https://perma.cc/FKU5-DT26].
60
See e.g., IND. CODE § 16-41-7.5-5 (West 2019).
61
INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH IN THE 21ST CENTURY 97
(2003), https://www.nap.edu/read/10548/chapter/5 [https://perma.cc/J6LB-UVBX].
62
Social Determinants of Health, WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/social_
determinants/sdh_definition/en/ [https://perma.cc/D2TP-WDL2].
63
See Lenny Bernstein, One of the Biggest Challenges of Kicking Addiction Is Getting
and Keeping a Job, WASH. POST (Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation
al/health-science/one-of-the-biggest-challenges-of-kicking-addiction-is-getting-and-keepin
g-a-job/2018/11/27/87e8a168-d958-11e8-aeb7-ddcad4a0a54e_story.html?utm_term=.dc8a
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extensively identified with the opioid epidemic. For example, OUD frequently is
identified as a “disease of despair,”64 similar to those detailed by Anne Case and
Angus Deaton and which are characterized by an increase in mortality and morbidity
among non-Hispanic white Americans without college degrees caused in part by “an
increasingly difficult labor market.”65 Increasing economic inequality and other
issues such as social isolation add to the picture and stoke addictions crises. In Dayna
Matthew’s words, “social determinants contribute to hopelessness and social trauma
that ‘set the stage’ for opioid abuse and dependency.”66 We also know the opposite
can be true, as improvements in healthcare lead to increased civic engagement such
as voting.67
In the absence of national health and public healthcare policies, we will
continue to see large geographical pockets suffer the worst of the opioid epidemic
as it falls disproportionately on “Tobacco Nation,”68 upper Midwestern,
Appalachian, and Southern states that exhibit poverty, inadequate health care,
underfinanced public health, and marginalized populations.69 Comorbid substance
use problems and other chronic diseases are far more likely to be found in the poor.70
However, these high risk states tend to perpetuate structural determinants as many
of them have either failed to expand Medicaid or have imperiled enrollment (and
hence access) by introducing administrative or work requirements.71 This lack of
2d195188 [https://perma.cc/4EQU-5S2W].
64
See, e.g., Jeff Guo, The Disease Killing White Americans Goes Way Deeper than
Opioids, WASH. POST (Mar. 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/
2017/03/24/the-disease-killing-white-americans-goes-way-deeper-than-opioids/?noredirect
=on&utm_term=.734ce9f859c2 [https://perma.cc/6Y32-Y2Y5] (internal quatations
omitted); MICHAEL MEIT ET AL., WALSH CTR. FOR RURAL HEALTH ANALYSIS,
APPALACHIAN DISEASES OF DESPAIR 1 (2017), https://www.arc.gov/research/researchreport
details.asp?REPORT_ID=139 [https://perma.cc/7VPM-68LF].
65
Anne Case & Angus Deaton, Mortality and Morbidity in the 21st Century, 2017
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 397, 399 (2017).
66
DAYNA BOWEN MATTHEW, USC-BROOKINGS SCAEFFER INITIATIVE FOR HEALTH
POLICY, UN-BURYING THE LEAD: PUBLIC HEALTH TOOLS ARE THE KEY TO BEATING THE
OPIOID EPIDEMIC 4 (2018), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/es_20
180123_un-burying-the-lead-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/VLY2-MXCT].
67
See Margot Sanger-Katz, When Medicaid Expands, More People Vote, N.Y. TIMES:
THE UPSHOT (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/08/upshot/medicaidexpansion-voting-increase.html [https://perma.cc/B2D4-79J8].
68
TRUTH INITIATIVE, TOBACCO NATION: THE DEADLY STATE OF SMOKING DISPARITY
IN THE U.S. 1–2 (Oct. 4, 2017), https://truthinitiative.org/sites/default/files/Tobacco-NationFINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/V3PY-XUGJ].
69
See Nicolas Terry & Aila Hoss, Opioid Litigation Proceeds: Cautionary Tales from
the Tobacco Settlement, HEALTH AFF.: BLOG (May 23, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/
do/10.1377/hblog20180517.992650/full/ [https://perma.cc/5CHF-ZW8R].
70
See Peter J. Cunningham et al., Income Disparities in the Prevalence, Severity, and
Costs of Co-Occurring Chronic and Behavioral Health Conditions, 56 MED. CARE 139
(2018) (noting that comorbid conditions are more prevelant among low-income people).
71
See infra text accompanying note 103.
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health equity, together with what sometimes appears to be a declaration of war on the
poor,72 make it hard to improve resilience to addictions crises such as by re-building
the social capital that seems to protect communities from the opioid epidemic.73
V. STRUCTURAL DETERMINANTS
The absence of a principled national healthcare policy, the uneasy alliance
between the federal government and the states on the financing of health insurance,
and the fragmented delivery of healthcare through heterogeneous private entities
create a breeding ground for structural determinants that adversely affect healthcare
generally and opioid treatment specifically. An earlier article argued in detail that
facets of the healthcare system are themselves structural determinants that obstruct
the remediation of social determinants of health or perpetuate them.74 Viewing the
healthcare system as a structural determinant explains at least some of its failures to
provide preventative care, treatment, and recovery service to those suffering from
OUD.75 Many of the barriers erected can be grouped as either access to healthcare
or healthcare delivery.
In the U.S., access to healthcare equates with access to public or private health
insurance. There is strong correlation between low rates of un-insurance and high
levels of MAT.76 In 2016, the Surgeon General’s report was clear, “a fundamental
way to address disparities is to increase the number of people who have health
coverage [and] The Affordable Care Act provides several mechanisms that broaden
access to coverage.”77 There are two principal mechanisms: lower cost individual
insurance available for purchase from the marketplace exchanges78 and Medicaid
expanded to a larger population.79 However, ACA exchange sabotage by the Trump
Administration, work requirements, and other barriers to Medicaid are increasing
the number of uninsured persons after the steady decline seen since the passage of
the ACA.80
72

Paul Krugman, The G.O.P.’s War on the Poor, N.Y. TIMES: OPINION (July 16, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/16/opinion/republican-war-on-poverty.html [https://per
ma.cc/JL5Z-6DX9].
73
Michael J. Zoorob & Jason L. Salemi, Bowling Alone, Dying Together: The Role of
Social Capital in Mitigating the Drug Overdose Epidemic in the United States, 173 DRUG &
ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 1, 7–8 (2017), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.drugalcdep.2016.12.011
[https://perma.cc/L93Y-BCK3].
74
Terry, supra note 10, at 58–59.
75
Id.
76
America’s Opioid Epidemic and Its Effect on the Nation’s Commercially-Insured
Population, BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD (June 29, 2017), https://www.bcbs.com/the-healthof-america/reports/americas-opioid-epidemic-and-its-effect-on-the-nations-commerciallyinsured [https://perma.cc/RS5E-284R].
77
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 12, at 6–15.
78
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1311(b), 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2018).
79
42 U.S.C. § 1396(a) (2019).
80
Margot Sanger-Katz, After Falling Under Obama, America’s Uninsured Rate Looks
to Be Rising, N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/
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The ACA sought to make the marketplace policies premiums affordable by
providing tax credits81 and requiring insurance-companies to subsidize costsharing.82 In very general terms, persons are eligible for financial assistance if their
income is between 138% and 400% of the Federal Poverty Level (“FPL”).83 The
exchange marketplaces showed some volatility under the administration of President
Obama but latterly premiums showed signs of stabilizing and growing their
enrollments.84 However, after the 2016 election of President Trump, the markets
again became volatile amidst threats of “repeal and replace,”85 the zero-outing of the
individual mandate,86 and various administration moves to sabotage the marketplace
processes and their risk pools.87 Premiums have continued to increase modestly;88

23/upshot/rate-of-americans-without-health-insurance-rising.html [https://perma.cc/DGM3Z3ME].
81
See generally King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2494–95 (2015) (holding that the
ACA authorized tax credits for health insurance purchased either from state or federally
established exchanges).
82
See BERNADETTE FERNANDEZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44425, HEALTH
INSURANCE PREMIUM TAX CREDITS AND COST-SHARING SUBSIDIES 10–13 (Apr. 24, 2018),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44425.pdf [https://perma.cc/J837-LGW4].
83
“Federal poverty levels are used to determine your eligibility for certain programs
and benefits, including savings on Marketplace health insurance, and Medicaid and CHIP
coverage.” Federal Poverty Level (FPL), HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/
glossary/federal-poverty-level-fpl/ [https://perma.cc/32XE-9QRG]. This percentage spread
depends on whether a state has expanded Medicaid. See generally Explaining Health Care
Reform: Questions About Health Insurance Subsidies, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND.
(Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/explaining-health-carereform-questions-about-health/ [https://perma.cc/PYB3-QJR6].
84
Dan Mangan, Obamacare Insurers See Better Financial Performance in 2017, ‘No
Sign of Market Collapse,’ CNBC (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/04/obama
care-health-insurers-see-improved-financial-performance-in-2017.html [https://perma.cc/
GX8J-Q6YX].
85
Sean Sullivan, Republicans Abandon the Fight to Repeal and Replace Obama’s
Health Care Law, WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost
/republicans-abandon-the-fight-to-repeal-and-replace-obamas-health-care-law/2018/11/07/
157d052c-e2d8-11e8-ab2c-b31dcd53ca6b_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.1ede74
5899d7 [https://perma.cc/UZ4W-9YMH].
86
Sy Mukherjee, The GOP Tax Bill Repeals Obamacare’s Individual Mandate. Here’s
What that Means for You, FORTUNE (Dec. 20, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/12/20/tax-billindividual-mandate-obamacare/ [https://perma.cc/E9L5-6DY9].
87
Sabotage Watch: Tracking Efforts to Undermine the ACA, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y
PRIORITIES, https://www.cbpp.org/sabotage-watch-tracking-efforts-to-undermine-the-aca
[https://perma.cc/55M7-KZN2].
88
Rabah Kamal et al., How Repeal of the Individual Mandate and Expansion of Loosely
Regulated Plans are Affecting 2019 Premiums, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Oct. 26,
2018), https://www.kff.org/health-costs/issue-brief/how-repeal-of-the-individual-mandateand-expansion-of-loosely-regulated-plans-are-affecting-2019-premiums/ [https://perma.cc/
K4QP-7MEP].
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however, enrollments are down.89 Another related phenomenon is picking up steam
in the private insurance market, this time in employer-funded group insurance:
increasingly, the insured are finding themselves underinsured because of increases
in out-of-pocket costs.90
Medicaid expansion, which became optional for the states after the Supreme
Court ruling in NFIB v. Sebelius,91 increased the upper level of eligibility for
Medicaid. Like those with marketplace policies, the newly eligible Medicaid
population are guaranteed certain essential health benefits including mental health
and substance use services.92 Beyond improving access to care, Medicaid also opens
paths to reimbursement for upstream services aimed at improving social
determinants of health.93 The obvious direct result of not expanding Medicaid is
maintaining a cohort of uninsured persons that likely correlates with a disease of
despair population. However, there are also indirect effects. For example, Medicaid
expansion correlates with reductions in uncompensated care94 and generally positive
financial performance of hospitals, and it reduces the likelihood of closure of rural
hospitals.95 Most importantly, expansion correlates with reduced rates of poverty.96
Medicaid expansion also seems to lift all boats; according to the U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO), “low-income adults in states that expanded Medicaid
generally reported better access to health care. For example, they were less likely to
89

Marketplace Enrollment, 2014–2019, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND.,
https://www.kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/marketplaceenrollment/?currentTimefra
me=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D
[https://perma.cc/3XBV-BMPD].
90
Sara R. Collins et al., Health Insurance Coverage Eight Years After the ACA: Fewer
Uninsured Americans and Shorter Coverage Gaps, But More Underinsured,
COMMONWEALTH FUND
(Feb.
7,
2019),
https://doi.org/10.26099/penv-q932
[https://perma.cc/WE37-M4KG].
91
567 U.S. 519, 585 (2012).
80
42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(1)(E) (2018).
93
Enrique Martinez-Vidal et al., Overcoming Challenges to Medicaid Investments in
Social Determinants of Health, HEALTH AFF.: BLOG
(June 13, 2018),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180612.152825/full/ [https://perma.cc/U
8D3-VHCV]; see also Samantha Artiga & Elizabeth Hinton, Beyond Health Care: The Role
of Social Determinants in Promoting Health and Health Equity, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY
FOUND. (May 10, 2018), https://www.kff.org/disparities-policy/issue-brief/beyond-healthcare-the-role-of-social-determinants-in-promoting-health-and-health-equity/ [https://perma.
cc/6HN7-7C9X].
94
David Dranove et al., The Impact of the ACA’s Medicaid Expansion on Hospitals’
Uncompensated Care Burden and the Potential Effects of Repeal, COMMONWEALTH FUND
(May 3, 2017), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2017/may/
impact-acas-medicaid-expansion-hospitals-uncompensated-care [https://perma.cc/8D9GBSJZ].
95
Richard C. Lindrooth et al., Understanding the Relationship Between Medicaid
Expansions and Hospital Closures, 37 HEALTH AFFAIRS 111, 116–18 (2018).
96
Naomi Zewde & Christopher Wimer, Antipoverty Impact of Medicaid Growing with
State Expansions over Time, 38 HEALTH AFFAIRS 132, 135–38 (2019).
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report having unmet medical needs (such as not being able to afford their
prescriptions)—whether or not they were insured.”97 Overall, the Medicaid
population maps closely to the population of nonelderly adults with opioid addiction
and even more so to those with low incomes.98 For example, after Kentucky
expanded Medicaid, it experienced a 700 percent increase in the utilization of
substance use services.99 Unfortunately, 14 states have still not expanded
Medicaid,100 including southern states with poorly performing healthcare systems.101
The Obama administration was successful in persuading some states with
conservative governments to expand Medicaid by approving § 1115 waivers that
required enrollees to have some “skin in the game” that require compliance with
administrative requirements, paying premiums, contributing to health savings
accounts, or requiring healthy behaviors.102 The Trump Administration has gone
further, approving provisions such as work requirements that the prior
administration rejected.103 Studies of these additional eligibility requirements show
a dramatic, negative effect on enrollment.104 Particularly troubling are projections
97

MEDICAID: Access to Health Care for Low-Income Adults in States With and
Without Expanded Eligibility, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF. (Sept. 13, 2018),
https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-18-607 [https://perma.cc/8Z37-8L9N].
98
Julia Zur & Jennifer Tolbert, The Opioid Epidemic and Medicaid’s Role in
Facilitating Access to Treatment, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Apr. 11, 2018),
https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/the-opioid-epidemic-and-medicaids-role-in-facilit
ating-access-to-treatment/ [https://perma.cc/E6D6-WT77].
99
FOUND. FOR A HEALHTY KY., SUBSTANCE USE AND THE ACA IN KENTUCKY (2016),
https://www.healthy-ky.org/res/images/resources/Full-Substance-Use-Brief-Final_12_16002-.pdf [https://perma.cc/N23K-KZAN].
100
Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion Decision, HENRY J. KAISER
FAMILY FOUND., https://www.kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-activity-aroundexpanding-medicaid-under-the-affordable-care-act/ [https://perma.cc/TW9M-SMKT]; see
also Rachel Garfield et al., The Coverage Gap: Uninsured Poor Adults in States that Do Not
Expand Medicaid, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (June 12, 2018), https://www.kff.org/
medicaid/issue-brief/the-coverage-gap-uninsured-poor-adults-in-states-that-do-not-expandmedicaid/ [https://perma.cc/5TCP-GSCG].
101
DAVID C. RADLEY ET AL., COMMONWEALTH FUND, 2018 SCORECARD ON STATE
HEALTH SYSTEM PERFORMANCE 3 (May 2018), https://interactives.commonwealthfund.org/
2018/state-scorecard/files/Radley_State_Scorecard_2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NPF3PH34].
102
See Seema Verma & Brian Neale, Healthy Indiana 2.0 Is Challenging Medicaid
Norms, HEALTH AFF.: BLOG (Aug. 29, 2016), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/h
blog20160829.056228/full/ [https://perma.cc/VS3F-THAN].
103
Sara Rosenbaum, The Trump Administration Re-Imagines Section 1115 Medicaid
Demonstrations — and Medicaid, HEALTH AFF.: BLOG (Nov. 9, 2017),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20171109.297738/full/ [https://perma.cc/
N23K-KZAN].
104
MaryBeth Musumeci et al., An Early Look at Implementation of Medicaid Work
Requirements in Arkansas, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Oct. 8, 2018),
https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/an-early-look-at-implementation-of-medicaidwork-requirements-in-arkansas/ [https://perma.cc/6DAM-JXKL].
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about the impact of work requirements; for example, based on experiences in other
states and other data, it has been estimated that Kentucky’s work requirement would
lead to over 100,000 persons losing their eligibility.105 Assuming that persons with
substance use disorder may have difficulty in fulfilling administrative requirements
and may churn in and out of employment, it may be that those with OUD will be
denied help from the program best matched to their circumstances.
Structural determinants impeding access are only half the story. Our healthcare
delivery systems also exhibit negative structural determinants. Many of these issues
are standard fare, describing a healthcare system that lacks an overarching policy, is
hopelessly fragmented leading to inadequate care coordination and case
management, and has insufficient wraparound services.106 There is evidence that
patients with multiple chronic conditions whose care is not coordinated are at far
higher risk of emergency department visits.107 As with other chronic conditions or
other vulnerable populations, those in need of treatment for OUD are particularly in
need of such services.108 In particular, OUD patients are in critical need of care
coordination.109 More broadly, the current OUD treatment delivery system simply is
incomplete. Reflecting the through line from the absence of a national health policy
through federalism to structural determinants, just because a state program is funded,
the services it requires may not be available. State healthcare systems have been
overwhelmed by demand for opioid services caused by a death of treatment centers
and a qualified workforce.110 Even if a person suffering from OUD can find an
outpatient treatment center, there is only a small chance that it will be suitable.111
Non-medical detoxification and recovery models, such as 12-step programs, are
used and often over-used in patients suffering from severe OUD, for whom the

105
Sara R. Collins et al., The Potential Implications of Work Requirements for the
Insurance Coverage of Medicaid Beneficiaries: The Case of Kentucky, COMMONWEATH
FUND (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/2018/oct/kentucky
-medicaid-work-requirements [https://perma.cc/9LPT-5BYQ].
106
See, e.g., FAMILIES USA, THE PROMISE OF CARE COORDINATION: TRANSFORMING
HEALTH CARE DELIVERY 3 (2013).
107
Lisa M. Kern et al., Fragmented Ambulatory Care and Subsequent Healthcare
Utilization Among Medicare Beneficiaries, 24 AM. J. MANAGAGED CARE 278, 281–82
(2018).
108
See, e.g., Jingping Xing et al., Care Coordination Program for Washington State
Medicaid Enrollees Reduced Inpatient Hospital Costs, 34 HEALTH AFF. 653, 657–59 (2015).
109
Mark Olfson et al., Causes of Death After Nonfatal Opioid Overdose, 75 JAMA
PSYCHIATRY 820, 824–25 (2018).
110
Christine Vestal, Still Not Enough Treatment in the Heart of the Opioid Crisis, PEW:
STATELINE (Sep. 26, 2016), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/state
line/2016/09/26/still-not-enough-treatment-in-the-heart-of-the-opioid-crisis [https://perma.
cc/ETM6-HB5X].
111
Ramin Mojtabai et al., Medication Treatment For Opioid Use Disorders in
Substance Use Treatment Facilities, 38 HEALTH AFF. 1, 1 (2019),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/pdf/10.1377/hlthaff.2018.05162 [https://perma.cc/SB8M4PTJ].
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standard of care is MAT.112 Indeed, many facilities remain detox-only or do not offer
a full range of evidence-based MAT.113 For example, only a small number offer all
three types of MAT (6.1%) and, even if they do, not all actually will receive MAT.114
These types of services cannot just be switched “on.” They are dependent on
investment, infrastructure, and workforce training. Some of the structural barriers
are path dependent reminders of the unsatisfactory, stigma-laden history of treating
those with behavioral health issues; segregating those suffering from substance from
mainstream healthcare delivery and leaving their “treatment” to psychiatric hospitals
or prisons.115 Examples include the Institutions for Mental Diseases (“IMD”)
exclusion that prohibited Medicaid financing for care in mental health and substance
use disorder residential treatment facilities larger than 16 beds, until it was
suspended by the SUPPORT Act.116 Limitations persist regarding Opioid Treatment
Programs (“OTP”), the required location for most MAT treatments.117 By law, OTPs
must be accredited by an approved accrediting body and certified by SAMHSA.118
Methadone can only be dispensed through an OTP certified by SAMHSA, and a few
states have no such facilities. Methadone-based treatment is absent from a third of
Medicaid state plans, and Medicare Part D (covering prescription drugs) does not
include methadone or buprenorphine when used for treatment of opioid dependence
in an opioid treatment program. Notwithstanding, innovation is possible. For
example, Vermont’s “Hub-and-Spoke” delivery model splits the state into four

112

Nora D. Volkow et al., Medication-Assisted Therapies — Tackling the OpioidOverdose Epidemic, 370 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2063, 2064–65 (2014); see also Drugs, Brains,
and Behavior: The Science of Addiction, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, https://d14rmgtrwz
f5a.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/soa.pdf [https://perma.cc/E448-PPRY] (“Research
shows that when treating addictions to opioids (prescription pain relievers or drugs like
heroin or fentanyl), medication should be the first line of treatment, usually combined with
some form of behavioral therapy or counseling.”).
113
Hannah K. Knudsen et al., Barriers to the Implementation of Medication-Assisted
Treatment for Substance Use Disorders: The Importance of Funding Policies and Medical
Infrastructure, 34 EVALUATION & PROGRAM PLAN. 375, 375–76, 379 (2011),
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evalprogplan.2011.02.004 [https://perma.cc/J3EU-MLGL]; see
also Brendan Saloner & Colleen L. Barry, Ending the Opioid Epidemic Requires a Historic
Investment in Medication-Assisted Treatment, 37 J. POL. ANALYSIS & MGMT. 431, 432
(2018).
114
Mojtabai, supra note 111, at 18–20.
115
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regions, each with a licensed outpatient treatment “hub” providing MAT.119 These
hubs are linked to primary care “spokes” that provide counselling and
buprenorphine. Depending on their needs, patients can be transferred between hub
and spokes.120 Overall, however, in a fragmented system without centralized
(including state or regional) planning it remains difficult to identify the levers or
incentives that would cause providers to invest in care coordination and wrap-around
services.
The opioid crisis is a wicked problem;121 so is our healthcare system. Faced
with complex, multi-faceted, interlocking problems, it is perhaps not surprising
when policymakers favor tackling simpler problems and racking up an easy win.
Indeed, the opioid crisis exemplifies efforts to solve macro problems with micro
solutions. For example, the crisis exposed the serious asymmetry of drug supply and
treatment. As with previous addictions crises, the instinctive reaction was to deal
with the problem on the supply-side with micro solutions, such as limitations on
prescribing,122 reimbursement restrictions,123 and the expansion of Prescription Drug
Monitoring Programs.124 The preferable solution would have involved confronting
the other side of the asymmetry, to improve harm reduction and SUD treatment.
Worse, because that was a micro-solution the prescription drug policies merely
kicked the can down the road as far as tackling street opioids and the probable future
undertreatment of pain.
As a recent Commonwealth Fund reported, for many, their high expectations
for U.S. healthcare are not delivered on as “it places unexpected and unnecessary
burdens on the sick. People struggle to obtain effective treatments and services.
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Pervasive fragmentation and lack of coordination across the health system make
obtaining services heavy labor for people with advanced illnesses or frailty.”125
VI. EXCEPTIONALISM AND STIGMA
Deficiencies in policy and planning, lack of system resilience, and barriers
created by structural determinants (when they are not simply denying access or
impeding quality care) tend to result in incremental or piecemeal “solutions” to
crises such as the opioid epidemic. Such an ecosystem (and, further, one not defined
by broad national or social principles) can create differential treatment for persons
(the access segmentation already discussed) or for diseases (for example, treating
OUD differently from other chronic diseases such as diabetes). Some of the
problems are caused by exceptional treatment of behavioral health while some of
the solutions create exceptions to general rules. Upstream exceptionalism is likely
explained by stigma. Downstream exceptionalism can cause it. And, as with deeply
entrenched social determinants of health, ultimately it will be next to impossible to
deal with addictions crises without eradicating stigma.
Historically, behavioral and non-behavioral healthcare developed separately.
Different rules regarding treatment, location of services, and data sharing bear
testimony to the policies born out of stigma that treat mental illness or substance use
differently from other chronic diseases. According to the Surgeon General’s report,
“because substance misuse has traditionally been seen as a social or criminal
problem, prevention services were not typically considered a responsibility of health
care systems and people needing care for substance use disorders have had access to
only a limited range of treatment options that were generally not covered by
insurance.”126
The ramifications have been serious. Although institutionalized care in
psychiatric hospitals eventually gave way to community care, the latter was provided
by nonintegrated treatment centers “geographically, financially, culturally, and
organizationally separate from mainstream health care.”127 The result was
stigmatizing separateness. SUD and mainstream healthcare even have distinct
federal confidentiality regimes; SUD is subject to the Confidentiality of Substance
Use Disorder Patient Records rule128 in addition to the HIPAA Privacy Rule which
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alone applies to patient data in most traditional healthcare environments.129 Cabining
SUD and other chronic diseases has negatively impacted the role of primary
healthcare in early diagnosis and discouraged mainstream providers from
prescribing MAT.130 It has also led to exceptional policies (that are also structural
determinants) not seen in the treatment of other chronic diseases, including the IMD
exception, tying MAT to OTPs, and the patient limit attached to the buprenorphine
waiver.131 These differentials offer insights into both the impact of stigma and also
the roots of its perpetuation.
Policymakers have attempted to close the gap between behavioral and
mainstream healthcare services. That was the thrust of both the Mental Health Parity
Act of 1996132 and the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008.133
The ACA went further, mandating substance use treatment as essential health
benefits in Medicaid and marketplace plans and reducing the chance of those with
mental health or substance use histories from being denied coverage by prohibiting
medical underwriting.134 However, as already discussed,135 it does not follow that
there are sufficient treatment resources to meet the demand. For example, those
seeking treatment will be forced “out-of-network” at a far higher rate than those
seeking other medical or surgical services136 and half of all marketplace plans have
behavioral health “narrow networks.”137
Exceptionalism surrounding substance use prevention, treatment, or recovery
perpetuates stigma. As described by Craig Lefebvre, “structural stigma consolidates
and sustains stigma through the cultural norms, institutional practices and policies
that constrain the opportunities and well-being of people addicted to opioids and
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provide a reinforcing context for stigma when practiced by individuals.”138 Stigma
endorses the moral defect theory of SUD rather than viewing it as another chronic
disease. And not treating it as a continuing chronic disease perpetuates the
dichotomous idea that a person with SUD is either “clean” or “addicted.”
Policymakers seem more comfortable with incremental moves over
fundamental change. Symbolic gestures such as the appointment of commissions139
or czars140 are far easier than the development, financing, and implementation of
complex policy solutions to a wicked problem. Those who question the value of
incremental reforms often run into the “perfection is the enemy of the good”
argument. However, as we face recurring addiction crises, “good” increasingly will
not be good enough.141
VII. FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES
The Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016 (“CARA”)142 was
the first major federal legislation to address the current opioid crisis. It authorized
federal grants to address harm reduction and healthcare issues such as educational
programs, naloxone availability, evidence-based treatment for the incarcerated,
disposal sites, MAT demonstration, and Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs
(PDMPs).143 CARA directly appropriated only $181 million per year.144 A few
months later Congress passed The 21st Century Cures Act (“Cures”).145 Cures
directly appropriated $1 billion in funding for the first two years of opioid-related
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programs.146 Subsequent appropriations bills continued or increased funding for
CARA and Cures treatment, prevention, and recovery programs to more than $3
billion for FY 2017 and $4.7 billion for FY 2018.147 For example, in April 2018,
HHS released $485 million to the states under SAMHSA Opioid State Targeted
Response grants authorized by the Cures Act.148 Most recently, the Substance Use–
Disorder Prevention that Promotes Opioid Recovery and Treatment for Patients and
Communities Act of 2018 (“SUPPORT”)149 promised approximately $9.3 billion in
opioid-related funds. However, most of those funds are re-authorizations of existing
programs.150 Notwithstanding, SUPPORT did authorize a new SAMHSA grant
program for establishing or operating Comprehensive opioid recovery centers.151
The Trump Administration has heralded these large sums designed to combat
the opioid crisis.152 However, although large, they do not map satisfactorily to a
national epidemic that has caused a trillion dollars of damage to the country.
According to a 2018 McKinsey report, “the opioid crisis has received less funding
and research attention than other pervasive problems in the US [such as Cancer or
HIV/AIDS] have received.”153 For example, while SUPPORT added $2.1 billion to
Medicaid funding, that sum represents just 0.04% of total Medicaid funding.154
Indeed, legislation proposed by Senator Elizabeth Warren and Representative Elijah
146
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Cummings suggested $100 billion in funding over 10 years.155 The disconnect
between the country’s losses caused by the opioid epidemic and the funds made
available by the federal government is perhaps one explanation why so many states
and counties are pinning their hopes on litigation against opioid manufacturers and
others in the distributions chain.156 Other issues with the federal grant programs have
surfaced. For example, the original two-year guarantee of funding in the Cures Act
was viewed as one-time money, causing states to hesitate to develop and build
programs that later would not be sustainable.157
In addition to funding state efforts to address the opioid epidemic, the CARA
Cures and SUPPORT Acts all sought to address some of the structural impediments
to prevention, treatment, and recovery. These positive steps include:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

155

Improvements in funding for Medicaid health homes that can coordinate
care. 158
A requirement that state Medicaid programs cover all three types of FDAapproved MAT from 2020 to 2025.159
Expanded Medicare use of telehealth treatment.160
Increased screening for opioid use disorder and other substance use
disorders among Medicare beneficiaries. 161
Expanded Medicare coverage of OTP care.162
An increase in the number of patients (up to 275) to whom qualified
physicians may prescribe MAT.163
Made permanent the MAT prescribing authority for physician assistants
and nurse practitioners.164
Suspended the so-called IMD prohibition for 2019–2023, allowing states
to use Medicaid reimbursement for certain inpatient treatment.165
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Established a six-year loan repayment agreements with substance use
disorder treatment professionals in high need areas.166
Provided resources for hospitals to develop discharge protocols that
provide naloxone and connection with peer-support specialists.167
Authorized a pilot program to provide persons in recovery with stable,
temporary housing.168

These reforms, if implemented in timely manner (and grant processes followed
by state implementation will create a lag), will help. Notwithstanding, too many of
the projects authorized by the SUPPORT Act eschew bold, direct, and timely
intervention and, for example, convene expert groups, request studies, research, or
reports.169 Other provisions tend to favor demonstration programs or pilot programs
rather than long-term strategies. And, little is done to address social determinants of
health or stigma. Furthermore, critics argue that the legislation takes “a scattershot
approach that nibbles at the issue around the margins — and misses problems that a
more comprehensive strategy or package of bills could fully address.”170 Addressing
the Medicaid provisions, Cindy Mann and Jocelyn Guyer perhaps captured the
SUPPORT Act’s overarching limitation, arguing that it is notable “for what it
does not include, most prominently, a major, sustained infusion of new funding to
expand community-based care for substance use disorders.”171
VIII. CONCLUSION
Wendy Parmet, discussing the healthcare of another marginalized, stigmatized,
vulnerable population, observed “non-citizen immigrants are the canaries in the
health care coal mine . . . they are among the most vulnerable groups in the United
States. Consequently, they are often the first to experience the gaps, inefficiencies,
and conflicts in our health care system.”172 So it is with those suffering from OUD.
Their chronic illnesses are not the product of moral defect, but the social
determinants of health that in many of our states show few signs of being addressed.
When those who suffer or their families seek help, they run into a healthcare system
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that is not bolstered by any comprehensive plan to provide patients with access to
care, is woefully underequipped to deal with system stressors such as epidemics,
lacks required services, and, even if such services do exist, is unable to deliver them
because of acute fragmentation. When reforms do occur, they tend to be exceptional
rather than holistic changes consistent with parity principles. As long as those
suffering from OUD remain marginalized and stigmatized, a feedback loop will
reduce the likelihood of meaningful changes in federal or state policies. Similar to
the undocumented, those suffering in the opioid epidemic provide us a window into
our healthcare policies and systems, a window that does not reveal an attractive
view.

